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Christian: 'The goal is not to hamstring closed source developers. It's just to validate clean code.' Right. So the cap is a rung, not a wall, and it now says so. L0 unattested -> 3 nothing but your word L1 declared -> 5 SBOM + signed hash + published destination allowlist L2 observed -> 7 someone other than you watched this exact binary L3 reproducible -> 9 anyone can rebuild it and get the same bytes L4 contested -> 10 someone tried to break it and published the attempt A court filing lifts the ceiling entirely, because it needs no vendor cooperation. db/attest/validate.mjs computes the level from which artifacts exist. A vendor cannot claim one. The load-bearing rule is the attestor column: a vendor running our harness produces a DECLARATION, not an OBSERVATION. Verified against three cases. A vendor claiming L2 with their own capture report is downgraded to L1 and fails validation. The same artifacts with us as attestor grant L2. A broken rebuild claim never reaches L3. Levels 3 and 4 survive a self-run on purpose: a public rebuild recipe and a published adversarial review can be re-executed or re-read by anyone, so who pressed the button stops mattering. Honest limit, written into the module: this cannot prove the absence of a backdoor. Rice's theorem makes that undecidable, and a backdoor triggered by remote config or message content is invisible to static inspection. An attestation raises the cost and shortens the shelf life. It is not a proof.
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268 B
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10 lines
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268 B
JSON
{
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"digest": "0dc5a4129eef262900a70dbdc743d99aa7fb50bbd778cf7ab58ebbbe4ac2308a",
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"algorithm": "sha256",
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"file": "catalog.json",
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"byte_length": 82952,
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"rebuilt_at": "2026-10-29T21:07:55.485Z",
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"method_version": "btr-0.1",
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"products": 123,
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"assessed": 1
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} |